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Unrestricted Warfare!!!
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    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Preface

    Part One: On New Warfare

    Chapter 1: The Weapons Revolution Which Invariably Comes First

    Chapter 2: The War God’s Face Has Become Indistinct

    Chapter 3: A Classic That Deviates From the Classics

    Chapter 4: What Do Americans Gain By Touching the Elephant?

    Part Two: A Discussion of New Methods of Operation

    Chapter 5: New Methodology of War Games

    Chapter 6: Seeking Rules of Victory: The Force Moves Away From the Point of the Enemy’s
    Attack

    Chapter 7: Ten Thousand Methods Combined as One: Combinations That Transcend
    Boundaries

    Chapter 8: Essential Principles

    Conclusion

    Afterword

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    Preface

    [pp 1-5 in original]

    [FBIS Translated Text] Everyone who has lived through the last decade of the 20th century will
    have a profound sense of the changes in the world. We don’t believe that there is anyone who
    would claim that there has been any decade in history in which the changes have been greater
    than those of this decade. Naturally, the causes behind the enormous changes are too numerous
    to mention, but there are only a few reasons that people bring up repeatedly. One of those is the
    Gulf War.
    One war changed the world. Linking such a conclusion to a war which occurred one time in a
    limited area and which only lasted 42 days seems like something of an exaggeration. However,
    that is indeed what the facts are, and there is no need to enumerate one by one all the new words
    that began to appear after 17 January 1991. It is only necessary to cite the former Soviet Union,
    Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, cloning, Microsoft, hackers, the Internet, the Southeast Asian
    financial crisis, the euro, as well as the world’s final and only superpower — the United States.
    These are sufficient. They pretty much constitute the main subjects on this planet for the past
    decade.
    However, what we want to say is that all these are related to that war, either directly or
    indirectly. However, we definitely do not intend to mythicize war, particularly not a lopsided war
    in which there was such a great difference in the actual power of the opposing parties. Precisely
    the contrary. In our in-depth consideration of this war, which changed the entire world in merely
    half a month, we have also noted another fact, which is that war itself has now been changed. We
    discovered that, from those wars which could be described in glorious and dominating terms, to
    the aftermath of the acme of what it has been possible to achieve to date in the history of warfare,
    that war, which people originally felt was one of the more important roles to be played out on the
    world stage, has at one stroke taken the seat of a B actor.

    A war which changed the world ultimately changed war itself. This is truly fantastic, yet it also
    causes people to ponder deeply. No, what we are referring to are not changes in the instruments
    of war, the technology of war, the modes of war, or the forms of war. What we are referring to is
    the function of warfare. Who could imagine that an insufferably arrogant actor, whose
    appearance has changed the entire plot, suddenly finds that he himself is actually the last person
    to play this unique role. Furthermore, without waiting for him to leave the stage, he has already
    been told that there is no great likelihood that he will again handle an A role, at least not a central
    role in which he alone occupies center stage. What kind of feeling would this be?
    Perhaps those who feel this most deeply are the Americans, who probably should be counted as
    among the few who want to play all the roles, including savior, fireman, world policeman, and an
    emissary of peace, etc. In the aftermath of “Desert Storm,” Uncle Sam has not been able to again
    achieve a commendable victory. Whether it was in Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, this has
    invariably been the case. In particular, in the most recent action in which the United States and
    Britain teamed up to carry out air attacks on Iraq, it was the same stage, the same method, and
    the same actors, but there was no way to successfully perform the magnificent drama that had
    made such a profound impression eight years earlier. Faced with political, economic, cultural,
    diplomatic, ethnic, and religious issues, etc., that are more complex than they are in the minds of
    most of the military men in the world, the limitations of the military means, which had heretofore
    always been successful, suddenly became apparent. However, in the age of “might makes right” –
    – and most of the history of this century falls into this period — these were issues which did not
    constitute a problem. The problem is that the U.S.-led multinational forces brought this period to
    a close in the desert region of Kuwait, thus beginning a new period.
    At present it is still hard to see if this age will lead to the unemployment of large numbers of
    military personnel, nor will it cause war to vanish from this world. All these are still
    undetermined. The only point which is certain is that, from this point on, war will no longer be what it was originally. Which is to say that, if in the days to come mankind has no choice but to
    engage in war, it can no longer be carried out in the ways with which we are familiar.
    It is impossible for us to deny the impact on human society and its soul of the new motivations
    represented by economic freedom, the concept of human rights, and the awareness of
    environmental protection, but it is certain that the metamorphosis of warfare will have a more
    complex backdrop. Otherwise, the immortal bird of warfare will not be able to attain nirvana
    when it is on the verge of decline: When people begin to lean toward and rejoice in the reduced
    use of military force to resolve conflicts, war will be reborn in another form and in another arena,
    becoming an instrument of enormous power in the hands of all those who harbor intentions of
    controlling other countries or regions. In this sense, there is reason for us to maintain that the
    financial attack by George Soros on East Asia, the terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy by Usama
    Bin Laden, the gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the disciples of the Aum Shinri Kyo, and the
    havoc wreaked by the likes of Morris Jr. on the Internet, in which the degree of destruction is by
    no means second to that of a war, represent semi-warfare, quasi-warfare, and sub-warfare, that is,
    the embryonic form of another kind of warfare.
    But whatever you call them, they cannot make us more optimistic than in the past. We have no
    reason for optimism. This is because the reduction of the functions of warfare in a pure sense
    does not mean at all that war has ended. Even in the so-called post-modern, post-industrial age,
    warfare will not be totally dismantled. It has only re-invaded human society in a more complex,
    more extensive, more concealed, and more subtle manner. It is as Byron said in his poem
    mourning Shelley, “Nothing has happened, he has only undergone a sea change.” War which has
    undergone the changes of modern technology and the market system will be launched even more
    in atypical forms. In other words, while we are seeing a relative reduction in military violence, at
    the same time we definitely are seeing an increase in political, economic, and technological
    violence. However, regardless of the form the violence takes, war is war, and a change in the
    external appearance does not keep any war from abiding by the principles of war.

    If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no longer “using armed force to compel the
    enemy to submit to one’s will,” but rather are “using all means, including armed force or non-
    armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to
    accept one’s interests.”
    This represents change. A change in war and a change in the mode of war occasioned by this. So,
    just what has led to the change? What kind of changes are they? Where are the changes headed?
    How does one face these changes? This is the topic that this book attempts to touch on and shed
    light on, and it is also our motivation in deciding to write this book.
    [Written on 17 January 1999, the 8th anniversary of the outbreak of the Gulf War]

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    Part One: On New Warfare

    “Although ancient states were great, they inevitably perished when they were fond of war” —
    Sima Rangju

    .Technology is the Totem of Modern Man [1]

    Stirred by the warm breeze of utilitarianism, it is not surprising that technology is more in favor
    with people than science is. The age of great scientific discoveries had already been left behind
    before Einstein’s time. However, modern man is increasingly inclined to seeing all his dreams
    come true during his lifetime. This causes him, when betting on his own future, to prostrate
    himself and expect wonders from technology through a 1000-power concave lens. In this way,
    technology has achieved startling and explosive developments in a rather short period of time,
    and this has resulted in innumerable benefits for mankind, which is anxious for quick success
    and instant rewards. However, we proudly term this technological progress, not realizing that at
    this time we have already consigned ourselves to a benighted technological age in which we
    have lost our hearts [2].

    Technology today is becoming increasingly dazzling and uncontrollable. Bell Labs and Sony
    continue to put out novel toys, Bill Gates opens new “Windows” each year, and “Dolly,” the
    cloned sheep, proves that mankind is now planning to take the place of God the Creator. The
    fearsome Russian-built SU-27 fighter has not been put to use on any battlefield, and already the
    SU-35 has emerged to strike a pose [3], but whether or not, once it has exhausted its time in the
    limelight, the SU-35 will be able to retire having rendered meritorious service is still a matter of
    considerable doubt. Technology is like “magic shoes” on the feet of mankind, and after the
    spring has been wound tightly by commercial interests, people can only dance along with the
    shoes, whirling rapidly in time to the beat that they set.

    The names Watt and Edison are nearly synonymous with great technical inventions, and using
    these great technological masters to name their age may be said to be reasonable. However, from
    then on, the situation changed, and the countless and varied technological discoveries of the past
    100 years or so makes it difficult for the appearance of any new technology to take on any self-
    importance in the realm of human life. While it may be said that the formulations of “the age of
    the steam engine” and “the age of electrification” can be said to be names which reflect the
    realities of the time, today, with all kinds of new technology continuously beating against the
    banks of the age so that people scarcely have the time to accord them brief acclaim while being
    overwhelmed by an even higher and newer wave of technology, the age in which an era could be
    named for a single new technology or a single inventor has become a thing of the past. This is
    the reason why, if one calls the current era the “nuclear age” or the “information age,” it will still
    give people the impression that you are using one aspect to typify the whole situation.
    There is absolutely no doubt that the appearance of information technology has been good news
    for human civilization. This is because it is the only thing to date that is capable of infusing
    greater energy into the technological “plague” that has been released from Pandora’s box, and at
    the same time it also provides a magic charm as a means of controlling it [technology]. It is just
    that, at present, there is still a question of who in turn will have a magic charm with which to
    control it [information technology]. The pessimistic viewpoint is that, if this technology develops
    in a direction which cannot be controlled by man, ultimately it will turn mankind into its victim
    [4]. However, this frightening conclusion is totally incapable of reducing people’s ardor for it.
    The optimistic prospects that it displays itself are intensely seductive for mankind, which has a
    thirst for technical progress. After all, its unique features of exchanging and sharing represent the
    light of intelligence which we can hope will lead mankind out of the barbarism of technology,
    although this is still not sufficient to make us like those futurists who cannot see the forest for the
    trees, and who use its name to label the entire age. Its characteristics are precisely what keep it
    from being able to replace the various technologies that we already have in great quantity, that are just emerging, or which are about to be born, particularly those such as biotechnology,
    materials technology, and nanotechnology, these technologies which have a symbiotic
    relationship with information technology in which they rely on and promote one another.
    Over the past 300 years, people have long since become accustomed to blindly falling in love
    with the new and discarding the old in the realm of technology, and the endless pursuit of new
    technology has become a panacea to resolve all the difficult questions of existence. Infatuated
    with it, people have gradually gone astray. Just as one will often commit ten other mistakes to
    cover up one, to solve one difficult problem people do not hesitate to bring ten more on
    themselves [5]. For example, for a more convenient means of transportation, people invented
    cars, but a long string of problems followed closely on the heels of the automobile — mining and
    smelting, mechanical processing, oil extraction, rubber refining, and road-building, etc., which in
    turn required a long string of technical means to solve, until ultimately it led to pollution of the
    environment, destroying resources, taking over farmland, traffic accidents, and a host of thornier
    problems. In the long run, comparing the original goal of using cars for transportation with these
    derivative problems, it almost seems unimportant. In this way, the irrational expansion of
    technology causes mankind to continually lose his goals in the complex ramifications of the tree
    of technology, losing his way and forgetting how to get back. We may as well dub this
    phenomenon the “ramification effect.” Fortunately, at this time, modern information technology
    made its appearance. We can say with certainty that this is the most important revolution in the
    history of technology. Its revolutionary significance is not merely in that it is a brand new
    technology itself, but more in that it is a kind of bonding agent which can lightly penetrate the
    layers of barriers between technologies and link various technologies which appear to be totally
    unrelated. Through its bonding, not only is it possible to derive numerous new technologies
    which are neither one thing nor the other while they also represent this and that, and furthermore
    it also provides a kind of brand new approach to the relationship between man and technology.
    Only from the perspective of mankind can mankind clearly perceive the essence of technology as a tool, and only then can he avoid becoming a slave to technology — to the tool — during the
    process of resolving the difficult problems he faces in his existence. Mankind is completely
    capable of fully developing his own powers of imagination so that, when each technology is used
    its potential is exhausted, and not being like a bear breaking off corncobs, only able to
    continually use new technology to replace the old. Today, the independent use of individual
    technologies is now becoming more and more unimaginable. The emergence of information
    technology has presented endless possibilities for match-ups involving various old and new
    technologies and among new and advanced technologies. Countless facts have demonstrated that
    the integrated use of technology is able to promote social progress more than even the discovery
    of the technology [6].
    The situation of loud solo parts is in the process of being replaced by a multi-part chorus. The
    general fusion of technology is irreversibly guiding the rising globalization trend, while the
    globalization trend in turn is accelerating the process of the general fusion of technology, and
    this is the basic characteristic of our age.
    This characteristic will inevitably project its features on every direction of the age, and naturally
    the realm of war will be no exception. No military force that thirsts for modernization can get by
    without nurturing new technology, while the demands of war have always been the midwife of
    new technology. During the Gulf War, more than 500 kinds of new and advanced technology of
    the 80s ascended the stage to strike a pose, making the war simply seem like a demonstration site
    for new weaponry. However, the thing that left a profound impression on people was not the new
    weaponry per se, but was rather the trend of systemization in the development and use of the
    weapons. Like the “Patriots” intercepting the “Scuds,” it seemed as simple as shooting birds with
    a shotgun, while in fact it involved numerous weapons deployed over more than half the globe:
    After a DSP satellite identified a target, an alarm was sent to a ground station in Australia, which
    was then sent to the central command post in Riyadh through the U.S. Cheyenne Mountain
    command post, after which the “Patriot” operators were ordered to take their battle stations, all of which took place in the mere 90-second alarm stage, relying on numerous relays and
    coordination of space-based systems and C3I systems, truly a “shot heard ’round the world.” The
    real-time coordination of numerous weapons over great distances created an unprecedented
    combat capability, and this was precisely something that was unimaginable prior to the
    emergence of information technology. While it may be said that the emergence of individual
    weapons prior to World War II was still able to trigger a military revolution, today no-one is
    capable of dominating the scene alone.
    War in the age of technological integration and globalization has eliminated the right of weapons
    to label war and, with regard to the new starting point, has realigned the relationship of weapons
    to war, while the appearance of weapons of new concepts, and particularly new concepts of
    weapons, has gradually blurred the face of war. Does a single “hacker” attack count as a hostile
    act or not? Can using financial instruments to destroy a country’s economy be seen as a battle?
    Did CNN’s broadcast of an exposed corpse of a U.S. soldier in the streets of Mogadishu shake
    the determination of the Americans to act as the world’s policeman, thereby altering the world’s
    strategic situation? And should an assessment of wartime actions look at the means or the
    results? Obviously, proceeding with the traditional definition of war in mind, there is no longer
    any way to answer the above questions. When we suddenly realize that all these non-war actions
    may be the new factors constituting future warfare, we have to come up with a new name for this
    new form of war: Warfare which transcends all boundaries and limits, in short: unrestricted
    warfare.
    If this name becomes established, this kind of war means that all means will be in readiness, that
    information will be omnipresent, and the battlefield will be everywhere. It means that all
    weapons and technology can be superimposed at will, it means that all the boundaries lying
    between the two worlds of war and non-war, of military and non-military, will be totally
    destroyed, and it also means that many of the current principles of combat will be modified, and
    even that the rules of war may need to be rewritten.

    However, the pulse of the God of War is hard to take. If you want to discuss war, particularly the
    war that will break out tomorrow evening or the morning of the day after tomorrow, there is only
    one way, and that is to determine its nature with bated breath, carefully feeling the pulse of the
    God of War today.

    Footnotes

    [1] In Man and Technology, O. Spengler stated that “like God, our father, technology is eternal
    and unchanging, like the son of God, it will save mankind, and like the Holy Spirit, it shines
    upon us.” The philosopher Spengler’s worship for technology, which was just like that of a
    theologian for God, was nothing but a manifestation of another type of ignorance as man entered
    the great age of industrialism, which increasingly flourished in the post-industrial age.
    [2] In this regard, the French philosopher and scientist Jean Ladrihre has a unique viewpoint. He
    believes that science and technology have a destructive effect as well as a guiding effect on
    culture. Under the combined effects of these two, it is very difficult for mankind to maintain a
    clear-headed assessment of technology, and we are constantly oscillating between the two
    extremes of technical fanaticism and “anti-science” movements. Bracing oneself to read through
    his The Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology, in which the writing is
    abstruse but the thinking recondite, may be helpful in observing the impact of technology on the
    many aspects of human society from a broader perspective.
    [3] Although the improvement of beyond visual range (BVR) weapons has already brought about
    enormous changes in the basic concepts of air combat, after all is said and done it has not
    completely eliminated short-range combat. The SU-27, which is capable of “cobra” maneuvers
    and the SU-35, which is capable of “hook” moves, are the most outstanding fighter aircraft to
    date.
    [4] F. G. Ronge [as published 1715 2706 1396 2706] is the sharpest of the technological
    pessimists. As early as 1939, Ronge had recognized the series of problems that modern technology brings with it, including the growth of technological control and the threat of
    environmental problems. In his view, technology has already become an unmatched, diabolical
    force. It has not only taken over nature, it has also stripped away man’s freedom. In Being and
    Time, Martin Heidegger termed technology an “outstanding absurdity,” calling for man to return
    to nature in order to avoid technology, which posed the greatest threat. The most famous
    technological optimists were [Norbert] Wiener and Steinbuch. In Wiener’s Cybernetics, God and
    Robots, and The Human Use of Human Beings” and Steinbuch’s The Information Society,
    Philosophy and Cybernetics, and other such works, we can see the bright prospects that they
    describe for human society, driven by technology.
    [5] In David Ehrenfeld’s book, The Arrogance of Humanism, he cites numerous examples of this.
    In Too Clever, Schwartz states that “the resolution of one problem may generate a group of new
    problems, and these problems may ultimately preclude that kind of resolution.” In Rational
    Consciousness, Rene Dibo [as published 3583 0355 6611 0590] also discusses a similar
    phenomenon.
    [6] In The Age of Science and the Future of Mankind, E. Shulman points out that “during the
    dynamic development of modern culture, which is based on the explosive development of
    modern technology, we are increasingly faced with the fact of multidisciplinary cooperation…it
    is impossible for one special branch of science to guide our practice in a sufficiently scientific
    manner.”

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    Chapter 1: The Weapons Revolution Which Invariably Comes First

    “As soon as technological advances may be applied to military goals, and furthermore are
    already used for military purposes, they almost immediately seem obligatory, and also often go
    against the will of the commanders in triggering changes or even revolutions in the modes of
    combat” — Engels

    The weapons revolution invariably precedes the revolution in military affairs by one step, and
    following the arrival of a revolutionary weapon, the arrival of the revolution in military affairs is
    just a matter of time. The history of warfare is continually providing this kind of proof: bronze or
    iron spears resulted in the infantry phalanx, and bows and arrows and stirrups provided new
    tactics for cavalry [1]. Black powder cannons gave rise to a full complement of modern warfare
    modes….from the time when conical bullets and rifles [2] took to the battlefield as the vanguard
    of the age of technology, weapons straightaway stamped their names on the chest of warfare.
    First, it was the enormous steel-clad naval vessels that ruled the seas, launching the “age of
    battleships,” then its brother the “tank” ruled land warfare, after which the airplane dominated the
    skies, up until the atomic bomb was born, announcing the approach of the “nuclear age.” Today,
    a multitude of new and advanced technology weapons continues to pour forth, so that weapons
    have solemnly become the chief representative of war. When people discuss future warfare, they
    are already quite accustomed to using certain weapons or certain technologies to describe it,
    calling it “electronic warfare,” “precision-weapons warfare,” and “information warfare.”
    Coasting along in their mental orbit, people have not yet noticed that a certain inconspicuous yet
    very important change is stealthily approaching.

    No One Has the Right to Label Warfare

    The weapons revolution is a prelude to a revolution in military affairs. What is different than in
    the past is that the revolution in military affairs that is coming will no longer by driven by one or
    two individual weapons. In addition to continuing to stimulate people to yearn for and be
    charmed by new weapons, the numerous technological inventions have also quickly eradicated
    the mysteries of each kind of weapon. In the past, all that was needed was the invention of a few
    weapons or pieces of equipment, such as the stirrup and the Maxim machine gun [3], and that
    was sufficient to alter the form of war, whereas today upwards of 100 kinds of weapons are
    needed to make up a certain weapons system before it can have an overall effect on war.
    However, the more weapons are invented, the smaller an individual weapon’s role in war
    becomes, and this is a paradox that is inherent in the relationship between weapons and war.
    Speaking in that sense, other than the all-out use of nuclear weapons, a situation which is more
    and more unlikely and which may be termed nuclear war, none of the other weapons, even those
    that are extremely revolutionary in nature, possesses the right to label future warfare.
    Perhaps it is precisely because people recognize this point that we then have formulations such
    as “high-tech warfare” and “information warfare” [4], whose intent is to use the broad concept of
    technology to replace the concept of specific weapons, using a fuzzy-learning approach to
    resolve this knotty problem. However, it seems that this still is not the way to resolve the
    problem.
    When one delves deeply into this, the term “high-technology”[5], which first appeared in the
    architectural industry in the United States, is in fact a bit vague. What constitutes high
    technology? What does it refer to? Logically speaking, high and low are only relative concepts.
    However, using an extremely mutable concept in this irrational manner to name warfare, which
    is evolving endlessly, in itself constitutes a considerable problem. When one generation’s high
    technology becomes low technology with the passage of time, are we still prepared to again dub
    the new toys that continue to appear as being high tech? Or is it possible that, in today’s
    technological explosion, this may result in confusion and trouble for us in naming and using each new technology that appears? Not to mention the question of just what should be the standard to
    determine whether something is high or not? With regard to technology itself, each technology
    has specific aspects, which therefore means that each has its time limits. Yesterday’s “high” is
    very possibly today’s “low,” while today’s “new” will in turn become tomorrow’s “old.”
    Compared to the M-60 tank, the “Cobra” helicopter, and the B-52, the main battle weapons of
    the 60s-70s, the “Abrams” tank, the “Apache” helicopter gunship, the F-117, the “Patriot”
    missiles, and the “Tomahawk” cruise missiles are high tech. However, faced with the B-2, the F-
    22, the “Comanche” helicopter, and the “J-Stars” joint-surveillance target-attack radar system,
    they in turn seem outmoded. It is as if to say there is the concept of high-tech weapons, which is
    a variable throughout, and which naturally becomes the title of the “bride.” Then, as the “flowers
    bloom each year, but the people change,” all that is left is the empty shell of a name, which is
    continually placed on the head of the girl who is becoming the next “bride.” Then, in the chain of
    warfare with its continuous links, each weapon can go from high to low and from new to old at
    any time and any place, with time’s arrow being unwilling to stop at any point; nor can any
    weapon occupy the throne of high technology for long. Since this is the case, just what kind of
    high technology does this so-called high-tech warfare refer to?
    High technology, as spoken of in generalities, cannot become a synonym for future warfare, nor
    is information technology — which is one of the high technologies of the present age and which
    seems to occupy an important position in the makeup of all modern weapons — sufficient to
    name a war. Even if in future wars all the weapons have information components embedded in
    them and are fully computerized, we can still not term such war information warfare, and at most
    we can just call it computerized warfare [6]. This is because, regardless of how important
    information technology is, it cannot completely supplant the functions and roles of each
    technology per se. For example, the F-22 fighter, which already fully embodies information
    technology, is still a fighter, and the “Tomahawk” missile is still a missile, and one cannot lump
    them all together as information weapons, nor can war which is conducted using these weapons be termed information warfare [7]. Computerized warfare in the broad sense and information
    warfare in the narrow sense are two completely different things. The former refers to the various
    forms of warfare which are enhanced and accompanied by information technology, while the
    latter primarily refers to war in which information technology is used to obtain or suppress
    information. In addition, the contemporary myth created by information worship has people
    mistakenly believing that it is the only rising technology, while the sun has already set on all the
    others. This kind of myth may put more money in the pockets of Bill Gates, but it cannot alter
    the fact that the development of information technology similarly relies on the development of
    other technology, and the development of related materials technology is a direct constraint on
    information technology breakthroughs. For example, the development of biotechnology will
    determine the future fate of information technology [8]. Speaking of bio-information technology,
    we may as well return to a previous topic and again make a small assumption: If people use
    information-guided bio-weapons to attack a bio-computer, should this be counted as bio-warfare
    or information warfare? I fear that no one will be able to answer that in one sentence, but this is
    something which is perfectly capable of happening. Actually, it is basically not necessary for
    people to wrack their brains over whether or not information technology will grow strong and
    unruly today, because it itself is a synthesis of other technologies, and its first appearance and
    every step forward are all a process of blending with other technologies, so that it is part of them,
    and they are part of it, and this is precisely the most fundamental characteristic of the age of
    technological integration and globalization. Naturally, like the figures from a steel seal, this
    characteristic may leave its typical imprint on each modern weapon. We are by no means
    denying that, in future warfare, certain advanced weapons may play a leading role. However, as
    for determining the outcome of war, it is now very difficult for anyone to occupy an unmatched
    position. It may be leading, but it will not be alone, much less never-changing. Which is also to
    say that there is no one who can unblushingly stamp his own name on a given modern war.

    “Fighting the Fight that Fits One’s Weapons” and “Making the Weapons to Fit the Fight”

    These two sentences, “fight the fight that fits one’s weapons” and “build the weapons to fit the
    fight” show the clear demarcation line between traditional warfare and future warfare, as well as
    pointing out the relationship between weapons and tactics in the two kinds of war. The former
    reflects the involuntary or passive adaptation of the relationship of man to weapons and tactics in
    war which takes place under natural conditions, while the latter suggests the conscious or active
    choice that people make regarding the same proposition when they have entered a free state. In
    the history of war, the general unwritten rule that people have adhered to all along is to “fight the
    fight that fits one’s weapons.” Very often it is the case that only after one first has a weapon does
    one begin to formulate tactics to match it. With weapons coming first, followed by tactics, the
    evolution of weapons has a decisive constraining effect on the evolution of tactics. Naturally,
    there are limiting factors here involving the age and the technology, but neither can we say that
    there is no relationship between this and the linear thinking in which each generation of weapons
    making specialists only thinks about whether or not the performance of the weapon itself is
    advanced, and does not consider other aspects. Perhaps this is one of the factors why a weapons
    revolution invariably precedes a revolution in military affairs.
    Although the expression “fight the fight that fits one’s weapons” is essentially negative in nature
    because what it leaves unsaid reflects a kind of helplessness, we have no intention of belittling
    the positive meaning that it has today, and this positive meaning is seeking the optimum tactics
    for the weapons one has. In other words, seeking the combat mode which represents the best
    match for the given weapons, thereby seeing that they perform up to their peak values. Today,
    those engaged in warfare have now either consciously or unconsciously completed the transition
    of this rule from the negative to the positive. It is just that people still wrongfully believe that this
    is the only initiative that can be taken by backward countries in their helplessness. They hardly
    realize that the United States, the foremost power in the world, must similarly face this kind of
    helplessness. Even though she is the richest in the world, it is not necessarily possible for her to use up her uniform new and advanced technology weapons to fight an expensive modern war [9].
    It is just that she has more freedom when it comes to the selection and pairing up of new and old
    weapons.
    If one can find a good point of agreement, which is to say, the most appropriate tactics, the
    pairing up and use of new and older generation weapons not only makes it possible to eliminate
    the weakness of uniform weaponry, it may also become a “multiplier” to increase the weapons’
    effectiveness. The B-52 bomber, which people have predicted on many occasions is long since
    ready to pass away peacefully, has once again become resplendent after being coupled with
    cruise missiles and other precision guided weapons, and its wings have not yet rested to date. By
    the use of external infrared guided missiles, the A-10 aircraft now has night-attack capabilities
    that it originally lacked, and when paired with the Apache helicopter, they complement each
    other nicely, so that this weapons platform which appeared in the mid-70s is very imposing.
    Obviously, “fight the fight that fits one’s weapons” by no means represents passive inaction. For
    example, today’s increasingly open weapons market and multiple supply channels have provided
    a great deal of leeway with regard to weapons selection, and the massive coexistence of weapons
    which span multiple generations has provided a broader and more functional foundation for
    trans-generation weapons combinations than at any age in the past, so that it is only necessary to
    break with our mental habit of treating the weapons’ generations, uses, and combinations as
    being fixed to be able to turn something that is rotten into something miraculous. If one thinks
    that one must rely on advanced weapons to fight a modern war, being blindly superstitious about
    the miraculous effects of such weapons, it may actually result in turning something miraculous
    into something rotten. We find ourselves in a stage where a revolutionary leap forward is taking
    place in weapons, going from weapons systems symbolized by gunpowder to those symbolized
    by information, and this may be a relatively prolonged period of alternating weapons. At present
    we have no way of predicting how long this period may last, but what we can say for sure is that,
    as long as this alternation has not come to an end, fighting the kind of battle that fits one’s weapons will be the most basic approach for any country in handling the relationship between
    weapons and combat, and this includes the United States, the country which has the most
    advanced weapons. What must be pointed out is that, the most basic thing is not the thing with
    the greatest future. Aggressive initiatives under negative preconditions is only a specific
    approach for a specific time, and by no means constitutes an eternal rule. In man’s hands,
    scientific progress has long since gone from passive discovery to active invention, and when the
    Americans proposed the concept of “building the weapons to fit the fight,” it triggered the
    greatest single change in the relationship between weapons and tactics since the advent of war.
    First determine the mode of combat, then develop the weapons, and in this regard, the first stab
    that the Americans took at this was “Air-Land battle,” while the currently popular “digitized
    battlefield” and “digitized units” [10] which have given rise to much discussion represent their
    most recent attempt. This approach indicates that the position of weapons in invariably preceding
    a revolution in military affairs has now been shaken, and now tactics come first and weapons
    follow, or the two encourage one another, with advancement in a push-pull manner becoming the
    new relationship between them. At the same time, weapons themselves have produced changes
    with epoch-making significance, and their development no longer looks only to improvements in
    the performance of individual weapons, but rather to whether or not the weapons have good
    characteristics for linking and matching them with other weapons. As with the F-111, which was
    in a class by itself at the time, because it was too advanced, there was no way to pair it up with
    other weapons, so all they could do was shelve it. That lesson has now been absorbed, and the
    thinking that tries to rely on one or two new and advanced technology weapons to serve as “killer
    weapons” which can put an end to the enemy is now outmoded.
    “Building the weapons to fit the fight,” an approach which has the distinctive features of the age
    and the characteristics of the laboratory, may not only be viewed as a kind of active choice, it can
    also be taken as coping with shifting events by sticking to a fundamental principle, and in
    addition to being a major breakthrough in the history of preparing for war, it also implies the potential crisis in modern warfare: Customizing weapons systems to tactics which are still being
    explored and studied is like preparing food for a great banquet without knowing who is coming,
    where the slightest error can lead one far astray. Viewed from the performance of the U.S.
    military in Somalia, where they were at a loss when they encountered Aidid’s forces, the most
    modern military force does not have the ability to control public clamor, and cannot deal with an
    opponent who does things in an unconventional manner. On the battlefields of the future, the
    digitized forces may very possibly be like a great cook who is good at cooking lobsters sprinkled
    with butter, when faced with guerrillas who resolutely gnaw corncobs, they can only sigh in
    despair. The “generation gap”[11] in weapons and military forces is perhaps an issue that
    requires exceptional attention. The closer the generation gap is, the more pronounced are the
    battle successes of the more senior generation, while the more the gap opens, the less each party
    is capable of dealing with the other, and it may reach the point where no one can wipe out the
    other. Looking at the specific examples of battles that we have, it is difficult for high-tech troops
    to deal with unconventional warfare and low-tech warfare, and perhaps there is a rule here, or at
    least it is an interesting phenomenon which is worth studying[12].

    Weapons of New Concepts and New Concepts of Weapons

    Compared to new-concept weapons, nearly all the weapons that we have known so far may be
    termed old-concept weapons. The reason they are called old is because the basic functions of
    these weapons were their mobility and lethal power. Even things like precision-guided bombs
    and other such high-tech weapons really involve nothing more than the addition of the two
    elements of intelligence and structural capabilities. From the perspective of practical
    applications, no change in appearance can alter their nature as traditional weapons, that is, their
    control throughout by professional soldiers and their use on certain battlefields. All these
    weapons and weapons platforms that have been produced in line with traditional thinking have
    without exception come to a dead end in their efforts to adapt to modern warfare and future warfare. Those desires of using the magic of high-technology to work some alchemy on
    traditional weapons so that they are completely remade have ultimately fallen into the high-tech
    trap involving the endless waste of limited funds and an arms race. This is the paradox that must
    inevitably be faced in the process of the development of traditional weapons:
    To ensure that the weapons are in the lead, one must continue to up the ante in development
    costs; the result of this continued raising of the stakes is that no one has enough money to
    maintain the lead. Its ultimate result is that the weapons to defend the country actually become a
    cause of national bankruptcy.
    Perhaps the most recent examples are the most convincing. Marshal Orgakov, the former chief of
    the Soviet general staff, was acutely aware of the trend of weapons development in the “nuclear
    age,” and when, at an opportune time, he proposed the brand-new concept of the “revolution in
    military technology,” his thinking was clearly ahead of those of his generation. But being ahead
    of time in his thinking hardly brought his country happiness, and actually brought about
    disastrous results [13]. As soon as this concept — which against the backdrop of the Cold War
    was seen by his colleagues as setting the pace for the time — was proposed, it further intensified
    the arms race which had been going on for some time between the United States and the Soviet
    Union. It was just that, at that time no one could predict that it would actually result in the
    breakup of the Soviet Union and its complete elimination from the superpower contest. A
    powerful empire collapsed without a single shot being fired, vividly corroborating the lines of
    the famous poem by Kipling, “When empires perish, it is not with a rumble, but a snicker.” Not
    only was this true for the former Soviet Union, today the Americans seem to be following in the
    footsteps of their old adversary, providing fresh proof of the paradox of weapons development
    that we have proposed. As the outlines of the age of technology integration become increasingly
    clear, they are investing more and more in the development of new weapons, and the cost of the
    weapons is getting higher and higher. The development of the F-14 and F-15 in the 60s-70s cost
    one billion dollars, while the development of the B-2 in the 80s cost over $10 billion, and the development of the F-22 in the 90s has exceeded $13 billion. Based on weight, the B-2 [14],
    which runs $13-$15 billion each, is some three times more expensive than an equivalent weight
    of gold [15]. Expensive weapons like that abound in the U.S. arsenal, such as the F-117A
    bomber, the F-22 main combat aircraft, and the Comanche helicopter gunship. The cost of each
    of these weapons exceeds or approaches $100 million, and this massive amount of weapons with
    unreasonable cost-effectiveness has covered the U.S. military with increasingly heavy armor,
    pushing them step by step toward the high-tech weapons trap where the cost stakes continue to
    be raised. If this is still true for the rich and brash United States, then how far can the other
    countries, who are short of money, continue down this path? Obviously, it will be difficult for
    anyone to keep going. Naturally, the way to extricate oneself from this predicament is to develop
    a different approach.
    Therefore, new-concept weapons have emerged to fill the bill. However, what seems unfair to
    people is that it is again the Americans who are in the lead in this trend. As early as the Vietnam
    war, the silver iodide powder released over the “Ho Chi Minh trail” that resulted in torrential
    rains and the defoliants scattered over the subtropical forests put the “American devils” in the
    sole lead with regard to both the methods and ruthlessness of new-concept weapons. Thirty years
    later, with the dual advantages of money and technology, others are unable to hold a candle to
    them in this area.
    However, the Americans are not necessarily in the sole lead in everything. The new concepts of
    weapons, which came after the weapons of new concepts and which cover a wider area, were a
    natural extension of this. However, the Americans have not been able to get their act together in
    this area. This is because proposing a new concept of weapons does not require relying on the
    springboard of new technology, it just demands lucid and incisive thinking. However, this is not
    a strong point of the Americans, who are slaves to technology in their thinking. The Americans
    invariably halt their thinking at the boundary where technology has not yet reached. It cannot be
    denied that man-made earthquakes, tsunamis, weather disasters, or subsonic wave and new biological and chemical weapons all constitute new concept weapons [16], and that they have
    tremendous differences with what we normally speak of as weapons, but they are still all
    weapons whose immediate goal is to kill and destroy, and which are still related to military
    affairs, soldiers, and munitions. Speaking in this sense, they are nothing more than non-
    traditional weapons whose mechanisms have been altered and whose lethal power and
    destructive capabilities have been magnified several times over.
    However, a new concept of weapons is different. This and what people call new-concept
    weapons are two entirely different things. While it may be said that new-concept weapons are
    weapons which transcend the domain of traditional weapons, which can be controlled and
    manipulated at a technical level, and which are capable of inflicting material or psychological
    casualties on an enemy, in the face of the new concept of weapons, such weapons are still
    weapons in a narrow sense. This is because the new concept of weapons is a view of weapons in
    the broad sense, which views as weapons all means which transcend the military realm but which
    can still be used in combat operations. In its eyes, everything that can benefit mankind can also
    harm him. This is to say that there is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon,
    and this requires that our understanding of weapons must have an awareness that breaks through
    all boundaries. With technological developments being in the process of striving to increase the
    types of weapons, a breakthrough in our thinking can open up the domain of the weapons
    kingdom at one stroke. As we see it, a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer
    virus invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country’s
    exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the Internet, all can be included in
    the ranks of new-concept weapons. A new concept of weapons provides direction for new-
    concept weapons, while the new-concept weapons give fixed forms to the new concept of
    weapons. With regard to the flood of new-concept weapons, technology is no longer the main
    factor, and the true underlying factor is a new concept regarding weapons.

    What must be made clear is that the new concept of weapons is in the process of creating
    weapons that are closely linked to the lives of the common people. Let us assume that the first
    thing we say is: The appearance of new-concept weapons will definitely elevate future warfare to
    a level which is hard for the common people — or even military men — to imagine. Then the
    second thing we have to say should be: The new concept of weapons will cause ordinary people
    and military men alike to be greatly astonished at the fact that commonplace things that are close
    to them can also become weapons with which to engage in war. We believe that some morning
    people will awake to discover with surprise that quite a few gentle and kind things have begun to
    have offensive and lethal characteristics.

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    Chapter 1 Continues…..

    The Trend to “Kinder” Weapons

    Before the appearance of the atom bomb, warfare was always in a “shortage age” with respect to
    lethal power. Efforts to improve weapons have primarily been to boost their lethal power, and
    from the “light-kill weapons” represented by cold steel weapons and single-shot firearms to the
    “heavy-kill weapons” represented by various automatic firearms, the history of the development
    of weapons has almost always been a process of continuing to boost the lethal power of
    weapons. Prolonged shortages resulted in a thirst among military men for weapons of even
    greater lethal power that was difficult to satisfy. With a single red cloud that arose over the
    wasteland of New Mexico in the United States, military men were finally able to obtain a
    weapon of mass destruction that fulfilled their wishes, as this could not only completely wipe out
    the enemy, it could kill them 100 or 1000 times over. This gave mankind lethal capabilities that
    exceeded the demand, and for the first time there was some room to spare with regard to lethal
    power in war.
    Philosophical principles tell us that, whenever something reaches an ultimate point, it will turn in
    the opposite direction. The invention of nuclear weapons, this “ultra-lethal weapon” [17] which
    can wipe out all mankind, has plunged mankind into an existential trap of its own making. Nuclear weapons have become a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of mankind which
    forces it to ponder: Do we really need “ultra-lethal weapons”? What is the difference between
    killing an enemy once and killing him 100 times? What is the point of defeating the enemy if it
    means risking the destruction of the world? How do we avoid warfare that results in ruin for all?
    A “balance of terror” involving “mutually-assured destruction” was the immediate product of this
    thinking, but its by-product was to provide a braking mechanism for the runaway express of
    improving the lethal capabilities of weapons, which was continually picking up speed, so that the
    development of weapons was no longer careening crazily down the light-kill weapons — heavy-
    kill weapons — ultra-lethal weapons expressway, with people trying to find a new approach to
    weapons development which would not only be effective but which could also exercise control
    over the lethal power of the weapons.
    Any major technological invention will have a profound human background. The “Universal
    Declaration of Human Rights” passed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 and the
    more than 50 subsequent pacts related to it have established a set of international rules for human
    rights in which it is recognized that the use of weapons of mass destruction — particularly nuclear
    weapons — is a serious violation of the “right to life” and represents a “crime against mankind.”
    Influenced by human rights and other new political concepts, plus the integration trend in
    international economics, the interlocking demands and political positions involving the interests
    of various social and political forces, the proposal of the concept of “ultimate concern” for the
    ecological environment, and particularly the value of human life, have resulted in misgivings
    about killing and destruction, forming a new value concept for war and new ethics for warfare.
    The trend to “kinder” [18] weapons is nothing other than a reflection in the production and
    development of weapons of this great change in man’s cultural background. At the same time,
    technological progress has given us the means to strike at the enemy’s nerve center directly
    without harming other things, giving us numerous new options for achieving victory, and all
    these make people believe that the best way to achieve victory is to control, not to kill. There have been changes in the concept of war and the concept of weapons, and the approach of using
    uncontrolled slaughter to force the enemy into unconditional surrender has now become the relic
    of a bygone age. Warfare has now taken leave of the meat-grinder age of Verdun-like
    campaigns.
    The appearance of precision-kill (accurate) weapons and non-lethal (non-fatal) weapons is a
    turning point in the development of weapons, showing for the first time that weapons are
    developing in a “kinder,” not a “stronger” direction. Precision-kill weapons can hit a target
    precisely, reducing collateral casualties, and like a gamma knife which can excise a tumor with
    hardly any bleeding, it has led to “surgical” strikes and other such new tactics, so that
    inconspicuous combat actions can achieve extremely notable strategic results. For example, by
    merely using one missile to track a mobile telephone signal, the Russians were able to still
    forever the tough mouth of Dudayev, who was a headache, and at the same time eased the
    enormous trouble that had been stirred up by tiny Chechnya. Non-lethal weapons can effectively
    eliminate the combat capabilities of personnel and equipment without loss of life [19]. The trend
    that is embodied in these weapons shows that mankind is in the process of overcoming its own
    extreme thinking, beginning to learn to control the lethal power that it already has but which is
    increasingly excessive. In the massive bombing that lasted more than a month during the Gulf
    War, the loss of life among civilians in Iraq only numbered in the thousands [20], far less than in
    the massive bombing of Dresden during World War II. Kinder weapons represent the latest
    conscious choice of mankind among various options in the weapons arena by which, after the
    weapons are infused with the element of new technology, the human component is then added,
    thereby giving warfare an unprecedented kind-hearted hue. However, a kinder weapon is still a
    weapon, and it does not mean that the demands of being kinder will reduce the battlefield
    effectiveness of the weapon. To take away a tank’s combat capabilities one can use cannons or
    missiles to destroy it, or a laser beam can be used to destroy its optical equipment or blind its
    crew. On the battlefield, someone who is injured requires more care than someone who is killed, and unmanned weapons can eliminate increasingly expensive protective facilities. Certainly
    those developing kinder weapons have already done cold cost-effectiveness calculations of this.
    Casualties can strip away an enemy’s combat capabilities, causing him to panic and lose the will
    to fight, so this may be considered an extremely worthwhile way to achieve victory. Today, we
    already have enough technology, and we can create many methods of causing fear which are
    more effective, such as using a laser beam to project the image of injured followers against the
    sky, which would be sufficient to frighten those soldiers who are devoutly religious. There are no
    longer any obstacles to building this kind of weapon, it just requires that some additional
    imagination be added to the technical element.
    Kinder weapons represent a derivative of the new concept of weapons, while information
    weapons are a prominent example of kinder weapons. Whether it involves electromagnetic
    energy weapons for hard destruction or soft-strikes by computer logic bombs, network viruses,
    or media weapons, all are focused on paralyzing and undermining, not personnel casualties.
    Kinder weapons, which could only be born in an age of technical integration, may very well be
    the most promising development trend for weapons, and at the same time they will bring about
    forms of war or revolutions in military affairs which we cannot imagine or predict today. They
    represent a change with the most profound implications in the history of human warfare to date,
    and are the watershed between the old and the new forms of war. This is because their
    appearance has been sufficient to put all the wars in the age of cold and hot weapons into the
    “old” era. Nonetheless, we still cannot indulge in romantic fantasies about technology, believing
    that from this point on war will become a confrontation like an electronic game, and even
    simulated warfare in a computer room similarly must be premised upon a country’s actual overall
    capabilities, and if a colossus with feet of clay comes up with ten plans for simulated warfare, it
    will still not be sufficient to deter an enemy who is more powerful with regard to actual strength.
    War is still the ground of death and life, the path of survival and destruction, and even the
    slightest innocence is not tolerated. Even if some day all the weapons have been made completely humane, a kinder war in which bloodshed may be avoided is still war. It may alter
    the cruel process of war, but there is no way to change the essence of war, which is one of
    compulsion, and therefore it cannot alter its cruel outcome, either.

    Footnotes:

    [1] Engels said, “In the age of barbarism, the bow and arrow was still a decisive weapon, the
    same as the iron sword in an uncivilized age and firearms in the age of civilization.” (Collected
    Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 4, People’s Press, 1972, p. 19)
    With regard to how stirrups altered the mode of combat, we can refer to the translation and
    commentary by Gu Zhun [7357 0402] of an article entitled “Stirrups and Feudalism — Does
    Technology Create History?” “Stirrups…immediately made hand-to-hand combat possible, and
    this was a revolutionary new mode of combat…very seldom had there been an invention as
    simple as the stirrup, but very seldom did it play the kind of catalytic role in history that this
    did.” “Stirrups resulted in a series of military and social revolutions in Europe.” (Collected
    Works of Gu Zhun, Guizhou People’s Press, 1994, pp 293-309).
    [2] “Compared to the development of any advanced new weapons technology, the invention of
    the rifle and the conical bullet between 1850-1860 had the most profound and immediate
    revolutionary impact…..The impact on their age of high-explosive bombs, airplanes, and tanks,
    which appeared in the 20th century, certainly does not compare to that of the rifle at the time.”
    For details, see T. N. Dupuy’s The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, part 3, section 21,
    “Rifles, Conical Bullets, and Dispersed Formations.” (Military Science Publishing House, 1985,
    pp 238-250).
    [3] In the engagement of the Somme river in World War I, on 1 July 1916 the English forces
    launched an offensive against the Germans, and the Germans used Maxim machine guns to strafe
    the English troops, which were in a tight formation, resulting in 60,000 casualties in one day.
    From that point, mass formation charges gradually began to retreat from the battlefield.

    (Weapons and War — The Historical Evolution of Military Technology, Liu Jifeng [0491 2060
    6912], University of Science and Technology for National Defense Publishing House, 1992, pp
    172-173).
    [4] If Wiener’s views on war game machines are not taken as the earliest discussion of
    information weapons. Then, a comment by Tom Luona [as published 5012 6719] in 1976 to the
    effect that information warfare is a “struggle among decision-making systems” makes him the
    first to come up with the term “information warfare” (U.S., Military Intelligence magazine, 1997,
    Jan-Mar issue, Douglas Dearth, “Implications, Characteristics, and Impact of Information
    Warfare”). Through independent research, in 1990, Shen Weiguang [3088 0251 0342], a young
    scholar in China who has over ten years of military service, published Information Warfare,
    which is probably the earliest monograph on information warfare. On the strength of his Third
    Wave, in another best-seller entitled Power Shift, Toffler gave information warfare a global look,
    while the Gulf War happened along to become the most splendid advertisement for this new
    concept of combat. At that point, discussing “information warfare” became fashionable.
    [5] Foreign experts hold that “high technology” is not a completely fixed concept and that it is
    also a dynamic concept, with different countries emphasizing high technology differently.
    Military high technology mainly includes military microelectronic device technology, computer
    technology, optoelectric technology, aerospace technology, biotechnology, new materials
    technology, stealth technology, and directed-energy technology. The most important
    characteristic of military high technology is “integration,” i.e., each military high technology is
    made up of various technologies to form a technology group. (For details, see “Foreign Military
    Data,” Academy of Military Sciences, Foreign Military Research Dept., No. 69, 1993).
    [6] Regarding the definition of “information warfare,” to date opinions still vary. The definition
    by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is: Actions taken to interfere
    with the enemy’s information, information processing, information systems, and computer
    networks to achieve information superiority over the enemy, while protecting one’s own information, information processing, information systems, and computer networks. According to
    U.S. Army Field Manual FM100-6, “the DOD’s understanding of information warfare leans
    toward the effects of information in actual conflicts,” while the Army’s understanding is that
    “information has already permeated every aspect, from peacetime to military actions in global
    warfare” (Military Science Publishing House, Chinese translation, pp 24-25). “In a broad sense,
    information warfare constitutes actions which use information to achieve national goals.” That is
    the definition given to information warfare by George Stein, a professor at the U.S. Air
    University, reflecting a somewhat broader vision than that of the Army. In an article in the 1997
    summer edition of “Joint Force Quarterly,” Col. Brian Fredericks proposed that “information
    warfare is a national issue that goes beyond the scope of national defense,” and perhaps this is
    the most accurate description of information warfare in the broad sense.
    [7] Running precisely counter to the situation in which the implications of the concept of
    “information warfare” are getting broader and broader, some of the smart young officers in the
    U.S. military are increasingly questioning the concept of “information warfare.” Air Force Lt.
    Col. James Rogers points out that “information warfare really isn’t anything new…whether or not
    those who assert that information warfare techniques and strategies will inevitably replace ‘armed
    warfare’ are a bit too self-confident.” (U.S. Marines magazine , April, 1997). Navy Lieutenant
    Robert Guerli [as published 0657 1422 0448] proposed that “the seven areas of misunderstanding
    with regard to information warfare are: (1) the overuse of analogous methods; (2) exaggerating
    the threat; (3) overestimating one’s own strength; (4) historical relevance and accuracy; (5)
    avoiding criticism of anomalous attempts; (6) totally unfounded assumptions; and (7) non-
    standard definitions.” (U.S., Events magazine, Sep 97 issue). Air Force Major Yulin Whitehead
    wrote in the fall 1997 issue of Airpower Journal that information is not all-powerful, and that
    information weapons are not “magic weapons.” Questions about information warfare are
    definitely not limited to individuals, as the U.S. Air Force document “The Foundations of
    Information Warfare” makes a strict distinction between “warfare in the information age” and “information warfare.” It holds that “warfare in the information age” is warfare which uses
    computerized weapons, such as using a cruise missile to attack a target, whereas “information
    warfare” treats information as an independent realm and a powerful weapon. Similarly, some
    well-known scholars have also issued their own opinions. Johns Hopkins University professor
    Eliot Cohen reminds us that “just as nuclear weapons did not result in the elimination of
    conventional forces, the information revolution will not eliminate guerilla tactics, terrorism, or
    weapons of mass destruction.”
    [8] Macromolecular systems designed and produced using biotechnology represent the
    production materials for even higher order electronic components. For example, protein
    molecule computers have computation speeds and memory capabilities hundreds of millions of
    times greater than our current computers. (New Military Perspectives for the Next Century,
    Military Science Publishing House, 1997 edition, pp 142-145).
    [9] Even in the Gulf War, which has been termed a testing ground for the new weapons, there
    were quite a few old weapons and conventional munitions which played important roles. (For
    details, see “The Gulf War — U.S. Department of Defense Final Report to Congress —
    Appendix”)
    [10] Starting with “Air-Land Battle,” weapons development by the U.S. military has mainly been
    divided into five stages: Propose requirements, draft a plan, proof of concept, engineering
    development and production, and outfitting the units. Development regarding the equipping of
    digitized units is following this same path. (U.S. Army magazine, Oct 1995). In March, 1997, the
    U.S. Army conducted a brigade-size high-level combat test, testing a total of 58 kinds of
    digitized equipment. (U.S. Army Times, 31 March, 7 April, 28 April 1997). According to John
    E. Wilson, commander of the U.S. Army’s Materiel Command, his mission is to cooperate with
    the Training and Doctrine Command, thinking up and developing bold and novel advanced
    technology equipment for them which meets their needs. (U.S., Army magazine, October 1997).

    [11] Slipchenko [si li pu qin ke 2448 0448 2528 3830 4430], chairman of the Dept. of Scientific
    Research at the Russian General Staff Academy, believes that war and weapons have already
    gone through five ages, and we are now heading toward the sixth. (Zhu Xiaoli, Zhao Xiaozhuo,
    The New U.S. and Russian Military Revolution, Military Science Publishing House, 1996
    edition, p 6).
    [12] The Journal of the National Defense University, No. 11, 1998, carried an article on Chen
    Bojiang’s interview of Philip Odeen, chairman of the U.S. National Defense Panel. Odeen
    mentioned “asymmetrical warfare” several times, believing that this is a new threat to the United
    States. Antulio Echevarria published an article in Parameters magazine in which he proposed that
    “in the post-industrial age, the thing that will still be most difficult to deal with will be a ‘people’s
    war.'”
    [13] U.S. defense specialists believe that Orgakov already saw that electronic technology would
    result in a revolution in conventional weapons, and that they would replace nuclear weapons
    with respect to their effects. However, Orgakov’s foresight and wisdom with regard to the issue
    of a revolution in military affairs ran aground because of structural problems. “If, in keeping up
    with the extremely high costs of the revolution in military affairs, a country exceeds the limits
    that can be borne by its system and material conditions, but it keeps engaging in military power
    contests with its opponents, the only outcome can be that they will fall further behind with regard
    to the military forces that they can use. This was the fate of Russia during the czarist and Soviet
    eras: the Soviet Union undertook military burdens that were difficult to bear, while in turn the
    military was unwilling to accept the need for strategic retrenchment.” (See U.S., Strategic
    Review magazine, spring 1996, Steven Blank, “Preparing for the Next War: Some Views on the
    Revolution in Military Affairs”).
    [14] In 1981, the U.S. Air Force estimated that it could produce 132 B-2s with an investment of
    $22 billion. However, eight years later, this money had only produced one B-2. Based on its value per unit weight, one B-2 is worth three times its weight in gold. (See Modern Military, No.
    8, 1998, p 33, and Zhu Zhihao’s Analysis of U.S. Stealth Technology Policy.)
    [15] The U.S. Dept. of Defense conducted an analysis of the 13 January 1993 air attack on Iraq
    and believes that there are numerous limitations to high-tech weapons, and that the effect of the
    combined effect bombs was at times better than that of precision bombs. (U.S., Aviation Week
    and Space Technology, 25 January 93).
    [16] New-concept weapons primarily include kinetic-energy weapons, directed-energy weapons,
    subsonic weapons, geophysical weapons, meteorological weapons, solar energy weapons, and
    gene weapons, etc. (New Military Perspectives for the Next Century, Military Science
    Publishing House, 1997 edition, p 3).
    [17] The point in substituting the concept of “ultra-lethal weapons” for the concept of “weapons
    of mass destruction” is to stress that the lethal power of such weapons exceeds the needs of
    warfare and represents a product of man’s extremist thinking.
    [18] The “kind” in “kinder weapons” mainly refers to the fact that it reduces slaughter and
    collateral casualties.
    [19] The April 1993 issue of the British journal International Defense Review revealed that the
    United States was energetically researching a variety of non-lethal weapons, including optical
    weapons, high-energy microwave weapons, acoustic beam weapons, and pulsed chemical lasers.
    The 6 March 1993 issue of Jane’s Defense Weekly reported that a high-level non-lethal weapons
    steering committee at the Dept. of Defense had formulated a policy regulating the development,
    procurement, and use of such weapons.
    In addition, according to the 1997 World Military Yearbook (pp 521-522), the U.S. Dept. of
    Defense has established a “non-lethal weapons research leading group,” whose goal is to see that
    non-lethal weapons appear on the weapons inventory as soon as possible.
    [20] See Military Science Publishing House Foreign Military Data, 26 March 1993, No. 27, p 3.

    Chapter 2 Coming Soon…..

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    Chapter 2: The War God’s Face Has Become Indistinct

    “Throughout the Entire Course of History,
    Warfare is Always Changing.” –Andre Beaufre
    Ever since early man went from hunting animals to slaughtering his own kind, people have been
    equipping the giant war beast for action, and the desire to attain various goals has prompted
    soldiers to become locked in bloody conflict. It has become universally accepted that warfare is a
    matter for soldiers. For several thousand years, the three indispensable “hardware” elements of
    any war have been soldiers, weapons and a battlefield. Running through them all has been the
    “software” element of warfare: its purposefulness. Before now, nobody has ever questioned that
    these are the basic elements of warfare. The problem comes when people discover that all of
    these basic elements, which seemingly were hard and fast, have changed so that it is impossible
    to get a firm grip on them. When that day comes, is the war god’s face still distinct?

    Why Fight and for Whom?

    In regard to the ancient Greeks, if the account in Homer’s epic is really trustworthy, the purpose
    of the Trojan War was clear and simple: it was worth fighting a ten-year war for the beautiful
    Helen. As far as their aims, the wars prosecuted by our ancestors were relatively simple in terms
    of the goals to be achieved, with no complexity to speak of. This was because our ancestors had
    limited horizons, their spheres of activity were narrow, they had modest requirements for
    existence, and their weapons were not lethal enough. Only if something could not be obtained by
    normal means would our ancestors generally resort to extraordinary measures to obtain it, and
    then without the least hesitation. Just so, Clausewitz wrote his famous saying, which has been an
    article of faith for several generations of soldiers and statesmen: “War is a continuation of
    politics.” Our ancestors would fight perhaps for the orthodox status of a religious sect, or perhaps
    for an expanse of pastureland with plenty of water and lush grass. They would not even have scruples about going to war over, say, spices, liquor or a love affair between a king and queen.
    The stories of wars over spices and sweethearts, and rebellions over things like rum, are recorded
    in the pages of history–stories that leave us not knowing whether to laugh or cry. Then there is
    the war that the English launched against the Qing monarchy for the sake of the opium trade.
    This was national drug trafficking activity on probably the grandest scale in recorded history. It
    is clear from these examples that, prior to recent times, there was just one kind of warfare in
    terms of the kind of motive and the kind of subsequent actions taken. Moving to later times,
    Hitler expounded his slogan of “obtaining living space for the German people,” and the Japanese
    expounded their slogan of building the so called “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”
    While a cursory look at these slogans would suggest that the goals must have been somewhat
    more complex than the goals of any previous wars, nevertheless the substance behind the slogans
    was simply that the new great powers intended to once again carve up the spheres of influence of
    the old great powers and to reap the benefits of seizing their colonies.
    To assess why people fight is not so easy today, however. In former times, the ideal of
    “exporting revolution” and the slogan of “checking the expansion of communism” were calls to
    action that elicited countless responses. But especially after the conclusion of the Cold War,
    when the Iron Curtain running all along the divide between the two great camps suddenly
    collapsed, these calls have lost their effectiveness. The times of clearly drawn sides are over.
    Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? These used to be the paramount questions in regard
    to revolution and counterrevolution. Suddenly the answers have become complicated, confusing
    and hard to get hold of. A country that yesterday was an adversary is in the process of becoming
    a current partner today, while a country that once was an ally will perhaps be met on the
    battlefield at the next outbreak of war. Iraq, which one year was still fiercely attacking Iran on
    behalf of the U.S. in the Iran-Iraq War, itself became the target of a fierce attack by the U.S.
    military in the next year (see Endnote 1). An Afghan guerilla trained by the CIA becomes the
    latest target for an attack by U.S. cruise missiles overnight. Furthermore, NATO members Greece and Turkey have nearly come to blows several times in their dispute over Cyprus, and
    Japan and South Korea, who have concluded a treaty of alliance, have come just short of an open
    break as a result of their dispute over a tiny island. All of this serves to again confirm that old
    saying: “all friendship is in flux; self-interest is the only constant.” The kaleidoscope of war is
    turned by the hands of self-interest, presenting constantly shifting images to the observer.
    Astonishing advances in modern advanced technology serve to promote globalization, further
    intensifying the uncertainty associated with the dissolution of some perceived self-interests and
    the emergence of others. The reason for starting a war can be anything from a dispute over
    territory and resources, a dispute over religious beliefs, hatred stemming from tribal differences,
    or a dispute over ideology, to a dispute over market share, a dispute over the distribution of
    power and authority, a dispute over trade sanctions, or a dispute stemming from financial unrest.
    The goals of warfare have become blurred due to the pursuit of a variety of agendas. Thus, it is
    more and more difficult for people to say clearly just why they are fighting (see Endnote 2).
    Every young lad that participated in the Gulf War will tell you right up front that he fought to
    restore justice in tiny, weak Kuwait. However, the real reason for the war was perhaps far
    different from the high-sounding reason that was given. Hiding under the umbrella furnished by
    this high-sounding reason, they need not fear facing the light directly. In reality, every country
    that participated in the Gulf War decided to join “Desert Storm” only after carefully thinking
    over its own intentions and goals. Throughout the whole course of the war, all of the Western
    powers were fighting for their oil lifeline. To this primary goal, the Americans added the
    aspiration of building a new world order with “USA” stamped on it. Perhaps there was also a bit
    of missionary zeal to uphold justice. In order to eliminate a threat that was close at hand, the
    Saudi Arabians were willing to smash Muslim taboos and “dance with wolves.” From start to
    finish, the British reacted enthusiastically to President Bush’s every move, in order to repay
    Uncle Sam for the trouble he took on their behalf in the Malvinas Islands War. The French, in
    order to prevent the complete evaporation of their traditional influence in the Middle East, finally sent troops to the Gulf at the last moment. Naturally, there is no way that a war prosecuted under
    these kinds of conditions can be a contest fought over a single objective. The aggregate of the
    self-interests of all the numerous countries participating in the war serves to transform a modern
    war like “Desert Storm” into a race to further various self-interests under the banner of a
    common interest. Thus, so-called “common interest” has become merely the war equation’s
    largest common denominator that can be accepted by every allied party participating in the war
    effort. Since different countries will certainly be pursuing different agendas in a war, it is
    necessary to take the self-interest of every allied party into consideration if the war is to be
    prosecuted jointly. Even if we consider a given country’s domestic situation, each of the various
    domestic interest groups will also be pursuing its own agenda in a war. The complex
    interrelationships among self-interests make it impossible to pigeonhole the Gulf War as having
    been fought for oil, or as having been fought for the new world order, or as having been fought
    to drive out the invaders. Only a handful of soldiers are likely to grasp a principle that every
    statesman already knows: that the biggest difference between contemporary wars and the wars of
    the past is that, in contemporary wars, the overt goal and the covert goal are often two different
    matters

    Where to Fight?

    “To the battlefield!” The young lad with a pack on his back takes leave of his family as his
    daughters and other relatives see him off with tears in their eyes. This is a classic scene in war
    movies. Whether the young lad is leaving on a horse, a train, a steamship or a plane is not so
    important. The important thing is that the destination never changes: it is the battlefield bathed in
    the flames of war.
    During the long period of time before firearms, battlefields were small and compact. A face-off
    at close quarters between two armies might unfold on a small expanse of level ground, in a
    mountain pass, or within the confines of a city. In the eyes of today’s soldier, the battlefield that so enraptured the ancients is a “point” target on the military map that is not particularly
    noteworthy. Such a battlefield is fundamentally incapable of accommodating the spectacle of
    war as it has unfolded in recent times on such a grand scale. The advent of firearms led to
    dispersed formations, and the “point” [“dian” 7820] type battlefield was gradually drawn out into
    a line of skirmishers. The trench warfare of the First World War, with lines extending hundreds
    of miles, served to bring the “point” and “line” [“xian” 4775] type battlefield to its acme. At the
    same time, it transformed the battlefield into an “area” [“mian” 7240] type battlefield which was
    several dozens of miles deep. For those who went to war during those times, the new battlefield
    meant trenches, pillboxes, wire entanglements, machine guns and shell craters. They called war
    on this type of battlefield, where heavy casualties were inflicted, a “slaughterhouse” and a “meat
    grinder.” The explosive development of military technology is constantly setting the stage for
    further explosive expansion of the battlespace. The transition from the “point” type battlefield to
    the “line” type battlefield, and the transition from the two-dimensional battlefield to the three-
    dimensional battlefield did not take as long as people generally think. One could say that, in each
    case, the latter stage came virtually on the heels of the former. When tanks began roaring over
    military trenches, prop airplanes were already equipped with machine guns and it was already
    possible to drop bombs from zeppelins. The development of weapons cannot, in and of itself,
    automatically usher in changes in the nature of the battlefield. In the history of warfare, any
    significant advance has always depended in part on active innovating by military strategists. The
    battlefield, which had been earthbound for several thousand years, was suddenly lifted into three
    dimensional space. This was due in part to General J.F.C. Fuller’s Tanks in the Great War of
    1914-1918 and Giulio Douhet’s The Command of the Air, as well as the extremely deep
    operations that were proposed and demonstrated under the command of Marshall Mikhail N.
    Tukhachevsky. Erich Ludendorff was another individual who attempted to radically change the
    nature of the battlefield. He put forth the theory of “total war” and tried to combine battlefield
    and non-battlefield elements into one organic whole. While he was not successful, he nevertheless was the harbinger of similar military thought that has outlived him for more than
    half a century. Ludendorff was destined only to fight at battlefields like Verdun and the Masurian
    Lakes. A soldier’s fate is determined by the era in which he lives. At that time, the wingspan of
    the war god could not extend any farther than the range of a Krupp artillery piece. Naturally,
    then, it was impossible to fire a shell that would pass through the front and rear areas on its
    parabolic path. Hitler was more fortunate than Ludendorff. 20 years later, he had long range
    weapons at his disposal. He utilized bombers powered by Mercedes engines and V-1 and V-2
    guided missiles and broke the British Isles’ record of never having been encroached upon by an
    invader. Hitler, who was neither a strategist nor a tactician, relied on his intuition and made the
    line of demarcation between the front and rear less prominent in the war, but he never really
    understood the revolutionary significance of breaking through the partition separating battlefield
    elements from non-battlefield elements. Perhaps this concept was beyond the ken of an out-and-
    out war maniac and half-baked military strategist.
    This revolution, however, will be upon us in full force soon enough. This time, technology is
    again running ahead of the military thinking. While no military thinker has yet put forth an
    extremely wide-ranging concept of the battlefield, technology is doing its utmost to extend the
    contemporary battlefield to a degree that is virtually infinite: there are satellites in space, there
    are submarines under the water, there are ballistic missiles that can reach anyplace on the globe,
    and electronic countermeasures are even now being carried out in the invisible electromagnetic
    spectrum space. Even the last refuge of the human race–the inner world of the heart–cannot
    avoid the attacks of psychological warfare. There are nets above and snares below, so that a
    person has no place to flee. All of the prevailing concepts about the breadth, depth and height of
    the operational space already appear to be old-fashioned and obsolete. In the wake of the
    expansion of mankind’s imaginative powers and his ability to master technology, the battlespace
    is being stretched to its limits.

    In spite of the situation described above, in military thinking, which is being drawn along by
    technology, there is still an unwillingness to simply stand still. Since technology has already
    served to open up more promising prospects for military thought, it is certainly not sufficient to
    simply expand the area of the battlefield in conventional “mesoscopic” [i.e., between
    macroscopic and microscopic] space. It is already clear that mechanical enlargement of the
    existing battlefield will not be the modus operandi for future battlefield change. The opinion that
    “the future battlefield expansion trend will be reflected in wars that are prosecuted in deeper
    parts of the oceans and at higher elevations in outer space” is merely a superficial point of view
    and conclusion that restricts itself to the level of general physics. The really revolutionary
    battlefield change stems from the expansion of the “non-natural space” [“feiziran kongjian” 7236
    5261 3544 4500 7035]. There is no way that the electromagnetic spectrum space can be regarded
    as a battlespace in the former conventional sense. The electromagnetic spectrum space is a
    different kind of battlespace that stems from technological creativity and depends on technology.
    In this type of “man-made space,” or “technological space” [see Endnote 3], the concepts of
    length, width and height, or of land, sea, air and outer space, have all lost their significance. This
    is because of the special properties of electromagnetic signals whereby they can permeate and
    control conventional space without occupying any of this space. We can anticipate that every
    major alteration or extension of the battlespace of the future will depend on whether a certain
    kind of technological invention, or a number of technologies in combination, can create a brand
    new technological space. The “network space” is now drawing widespread attention among
    modern soldiers. Network space is a technological space that is formed by a distinctive
    combination of electronics technology, information technology and the application of specific
    designs. If one maintains that a war prosecuted in this space is still a war in which people control
    the outcome, then the “nanometer space” which is emerging hard on the heals of the network
    space, bodes well for the realization of mankind’s dream–a war without the direct involvement
    of people. Some extremely imaginative and creative soldiers are just now attempting to introduce these battlespaces, comprised of new technologies, into the warfare of the future. The time for a
    fundamental change in the battlefield–the arena of war–is not far off. Before very long, a
    network war or a nanometer war might become a reality right in our midst, a type of war that
    nobody even imagined in the past. It is likely to be very intense, but with practically no
    bloodshed. Nevertheless, it is likely to determine who is the victor and who the vanquished in an
    overall war. In more and more situations, this type of warfare will go along hand-in-hand with
    traditional warfare. The two types of battlespaces–the conventional space and the technological
    space–will overlap and intersect with each other, and will be mutually complementary as each
    develops in its own way. Thus, warfare will simultaneously evolve in the macroscopic,
    “mesoscopic,” and microscopic spheres, as well as in various other spheres defined by their
    physical properties, which will all ultimately serve to make up a marvelous battlefield
    unprecedented in the annals of human warfare. At the same time, with the progressive breaking
    down of the distinction between military technology and civilian technology, and between the
    professional soldier and the non-professional warrior, the battlespace will overlap more and more
    with the non-battlespace, serving also to make the line between these two entities less and less
    clear. Fields that were formerly isolated from each other are being connected. Mankind is
    endowing virtually every space with battlefield significance. All that is needed is the ability to
    launch an attack in a certain place, using certain means, in order to achieve a certain goal. Thus,
    the battlefield is omnipresent. Just think, if it’s even possible to start a war in a computer room or
    a stock exchange that will send an enemy country to its doom, then is there non-battlespace
    anywhere?
    If that young lad setting out with his orders should ask today: “Where is the battlefield?” The
    answer would be: “Everywhere.”

    Who Fights?

    In 1985, China implemented a “Massive Million Troop Drawdown” in its armed forces. With
    this as a prelude, every major nation in the world carried out round after round of force
    reductions over the next dozen or so years. According to many commentators on military affairs,
    the main factor behind the general worldwide force reductions is that, with the conclusion of the
    Cold War, countries that formerly were pitted against each other are now anxious to enjoy the
    peace dividend. Little do these commentators realize that this factor is just the tip of the iceberg.
    The factors leading to armed forces reductions are by no means limited to this point. A deeper
    reason for the force reductions is that, as the wave of information technology (IT) warfare
    [“xinxihua zhanzheng” 0207 1873 0553 2069 3630] grows and grows, it would require too much
    of an effort and would be too grandiose to set up a large-scale professional military, cast and
    formed on the assembly lines of big industry and established according to the demands of
    mechanized warfare. Precisely for this reason, during these force reductions, some farsighted
    countries, rather than primarily having personnel cuts in mind, are instead putting more emphasis
    on raising the quality of military personnel, increasing the amount of high technology and mid-
    level technology in weaponry, and updating military thought and warfighting theory [see
    Endnote 4]. The era of “strong and brave soldiers who are heroic defenders of the nation” has
    already passed. In a world where even “nuclear warfare” will perhaps become obsolete military
    jargon, it is likely that a pasty-faced scholar wearing thick eyeglasses is better suited to be a
    modern soldier than is a strong young lowbrow with bulging biceps. The best evidence of this is
    perhaps a story that is circulating in Western military circles regarding a lieutenant who used a
    modem to bring a naval division to its knees [see Endnote 5]. The contrast between today’s
    soldiers and the soldiers of earlier generations is as plain to see as the contrast which we have
    already noted between modern weapons and their precursors. This is because modern soldiers
    have gone through the severe test of an uninterrupted technological explosion throughout the
    entire 100 years of the twentieth century, and perhaps also because of the salutary influence of
    the worldwide pop culture; viz., rock and roll, discos, the World Cup, the NBA and Hollywood, etc., etc. The contrast is stark whether we are talking about physical ability or intellectual ability.
    Even though the new generation of soldiers born in the 70’s and 80’s has been trained using the
    “beast barracks” style of training, popularized by West Point Military Academy, it is difficult for
    them to shed their gentle and frail natures rooted in the soil of contemporary society. In addition,
    modern weapons systems have made it possible for them to be far removed from any
    conventional battlefield, and they can attack the enemy from a place beyond his range of vision
    where they need not come face to face with the dripping blood that comes with killing. All of
    this has turned each and every soldier into a self-effacing gentleman who would just as soon
    avoid the sight of blood. The digital fighter is taking over the role formerly played by the “blood
    and iron” warrior–a role that, for thousands of years, has not been challenged.
    Now that it has come on the stage of action and has rendered obsolete the traditional divisions of
    labor prevailing in a society characterized by big industry, warfare no longer is an exclusive
    imperial garden where professional soldiers alone can mingle. A tendency towards
    civilianization has begun to become evident [see Endnote 6]. Mao Zedong’s theory concerning
    “every citizen a soldier” has certainly not been in any way responsible for this tendency. The
    current trend does not demand extensive mobilization of the people. Quite the contrary, it merely
    indicates that a technological elite among the citizenry have broken down the door and barged in
    uninvited, making it impossible for professional soldiers with their concepts of professionalized
    warfare to ignore challenges that are somewhat embarrassing. Who is most likely to become the
    leading protagonist on the terra incognita of the next war? The first challenger to have appeared,
    and the most famous, is the computer “hacker.” This chap, who generally has not received any
    military training or been engaged in any military profession, can easily impair the security of an
    army or a nation in a major way by simply relying on his personal technical expertise. A classic
    example is given in the U.S. FM100-6 Information Operations regulations. In 1994, a computer
    hacker in England attacked the U.S. military’s Rome Air Development Center in New York
    State, compromising the security of 30 systems. He also hacked into more than 100 other systems. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and NASA suffered damage,
    among others. What astounded people was not only the scale of those affected by the attack and
    the magnitude of the damage, but also the fact that the hacker was actually a teenager who was
    merely 16 years old. Naturally, an intrusion by a teenager playing a game cannot be regarded as
    an act of war. The problem is, how does one know for certain which damage is the result of
    games and which damage is the result of warfare? Which acts are individual acts by citizens and
    which acts represent hostile actions by non-professional warriors, or perhaps even organized
    hacker warfare launched by a state? In 1994, there were 230,000 security-related intrusions into
    U.S. DOD networks. How many of these were organized destructive acts by non-professional
    warriors? Perhaps there will never be any way of knowing [see Endnote 7].
    Just as there are all kinds of people in society, so hackers come in all shapes and colors. All types
    of hackers, with varying backgrounds and values, are hiding in the camouflage provided by
    networks: curious middle school students; on-line gold diggers; corporate staff members nursing
    a grudge; dyed-in-the-wool network terrorists; and network mercenaries. In their ideas and in
    their actions, these kinds of people are poles apart from each other, but they gather together in
    the same network world. They go about their business in accordance with their own distinctive
    value judgments and their own ideas of what makes sense, while some are simply confused and
    aimless. For these reasons, whether they are doing good or doing ill, they do not feel bound by
    the rules of the game that prevail in the society at large. Using computers, they may obtain
    information by hook or by crook from other people’s accounts. They may delete someone else’s
    precious data, that was obtained with such difficulty, as a practical joke. Or, like the legendary
    lone knight-errant, they may use their outstanding on-line technical skills to take on the evil
    powers that be. The Suharto government imposed a strict blockade on news about the organized
    aggressive actions against the ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia. The aggressive actions were
    first made public on the Internet by witnesses with a sense of justice. As a result, the whole
    world was utterly shocked and the Indonesian government and military were pushed before the bar of morality and justice. Prior to this, another group of hackers calling themselves “Milworm”
    put on another fine performance on the Internet. In order to protest India’s nuclear tests, they
    penetrated the firewall of the network belonging to India’s [Bhabha] Atomic Research Center
    (BARC), altered the home page, and downloaded 5 MB of data. These hackers could actually be
    considered polite. They went only to a certain point and no further, and did not give their
    adversary too much trouble. Aside from the direct results of this kind of action, it also has a great
    deal of symbolic significance: in the information age, the influence exerted by a nuclear bomb is
    perhaps less than the influence exerted by a hacker.
    More murderous than hackers–and more of a threat in the real world–are the non-state
    organizations, whose very mention causes the Western world to shake in its boots. These
    organizations, which all have a certain military flavor to a greater or lesser degree, are generally
    driven by some extreme creed or cause, such as: the Islamic organizations pursuing a holy war;
    the Caucasian militias in the U.S.; the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; and, most recently, terrorist
    groups like Osama bin Ladin’s, which blew up the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The
    various and sundry monstrous and virtually insane destructive acts by these kinds of groups are
    undoubtedly more likely to be the new breeding ground for contemporary wars than is the
    behavior of the lone ranger hacker. Moreover, when a nation state or national armed force,
    (which adheres to certain rules and will only use limited force to obtain a limited goal), faces off
    with one of these types of organizations, (which never observe any rules and which are not afraid
    to fight an unlimited war using unlimited means), it will often prove very difficult for the nation
    state or national armed force to gain the upper hand.
    During the 1990’s, and concurrent with the series of military actions launched by non-
    professional warriors and non-state organizations, we began to get an inkling of a non-military
    type of war which is prosecuted by yet another type of non-professional warrior. This person is
    not a hacker in the general sense of the term, and also is not a member of a quasi-military
    organization. Perhaps he or she is a systems analyst or a software engineer, or a financier with a large amount of mobile capital or a stock speculator. He or she might even perhaps be a media
    mogul who controls a wide variety of media, a famous columnist or the host of a TV program.
    His or her philosophy of life is different from that of certain blind and inhuman terrorists.
    Frequently, he or she has a firmly held philosophy of life and his or her faith is by no means
    inferior to Osama bin Ladin’s in terms of its fanaticism. Moreover, he or she does not lack the
    motivation or courage to enter a fight as necessary. Judging by this kind of standard, who can say
    that George Soros is not a financial terrorist?
    Precisely in the same way that modern technology is changing weapons and the battlefield, it is
    also at the same time blurring the concept of who the war participants are. From now on, soldiers
    no longer have a monopoly on war.
    Global terrorist activity is one of the by-products of the globalization trend that has been ushered
    in by technological integration. Non-professional warriors and non-state organizations are posing
    a greater and greater threat to sovereign nations, making these warriors and organizations more
    and more serious adversaries for every professional army. Compared to these adversaries,
    professional armies are like gigantic dinosaurs which lack strength commensurate to their size in
    this new age. Their adversaries, then, are rodents with great powers of survival, which can use
    their sharp teeth to torment the better part of the world.

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    Chapter 2 Continues…..

    What Means and Methods Are Used to Fight?

    There’s no getting around the opinions of the Americans when it comes to discussing what means
    and methods will be used to fight future wars. This is not simply because the U.S. is the latest
    lord of the mountain in the world. It is more because the opinions of the Americans on this
    question really are superior compared to the prevailing opinions among the military people of
    other nations. The Americans have summed up the four main forms that warfighting will take in
    the future as: 1) Information warfare; 2) Precision warfare [see Endnote 8]; 3) Joint operations
    [see Endnote 9]; and 4) Military operations other than war (MOOTW) [see Endnote 10]. This last sentence is a mouthful. From this sentence alone we can see the highly imaginative, and yet
    highly practical, approach of the Americans, and we can also gain a sound understanding of the
    warfare of the future as seen through the eyes of the Americans. Aside from joint operations,
    which evolved from traditional cooperative operations and coordinated operations, and even Air-
    Land operations, the other three of the four forms of warfighting can all be considered products
    of new military thinking. General Gordon R. Sullivan, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S.
    Army, maintained that information warfare will be the basic form of warfighting in future
    warfare. For this reason, he set up the best digitized force in the U.S. military, and in the world.
    Moreover, he proposed the concept of precision warfare, based on the perception that “there will
    be an overall swing towards information processing and stealthy long-range attacks as the main
    foundations of future warfare.” For the Americans, the advent of new, high-tech weaponry, such
    as precision-guided weapons, the Global Positioning System (GPS), C4I systems and stealth
    airplanes, will possibly allow soldiers to dispense with the nightmare of attrition warfare.
    Precision warfare, which has been dubbed “non-contact attack” by the Americans, and “remote
    combat” by the Russians [see Endnote 11], is characterized by concealment, speed, accuracy, a
    high degree of effectiveness, and few collateral casualties. In wars of the future, where the
    outcome will perhaps be decided not long after the war starts, this type of tactic, which has
    already showed some of its effectiveness in the Gulf War, will probably be the method of choice
    that will be embraced most gladly by U.S. generals. However, the phrase that really demonstrates
    some creative wording is not “information warfare” or “precision warfare,” but rather the phrase
    “military operations other than war.” This particular concept is clearly based on the “world’s
    interest,” which the Americans are constantly invoking, and the concept implies a rash
    overstepping of its authority by the U.S.–a classic case of the American attitude that “I am
    responsible for every place under the sun.” Nevertheless, such an assessment does not by any
    means stifle our praise of this concept because, after all, for the first time it permits a variety of
    measures that are needed to deal comprehensively with the problems of the 20th and 21st centuries to be put into this MOOTW box, so that soldiers are not likely to be in the dark and at a
    loss in the world that lies beyond the battlefield. Thus, the somewhat inferior “thought antennae”
    of the soldiers will be allowed to bump up against the edges of a broader concept of war. Such
    needed measures include peacekeeping, efforts to suppress illicit drugs, riot suppression, military
    aid, arms control, disaster relief, the evacuation of Chinese nationals residing abroad, and
    striking at terrorist activities. Contact with this broader concept of war cannot but lessen the
    soldiers’ attachment to the MOOTW box itself. Ultimately, they will not be able to put the brand
    new concept of “non-military war operations” into the box. When this occurs, it will represent an
    understanding that has genuine revolutionary significance in terms of mankind’s perception of
    war.
    The difference between the concepts of “non-military war operations” and “military operations
    other than war” is far greater than a surface reading would indicate and is by no means simply a
    matter of changing the order of some words in a kind of word game. The latter concept,
    MOOTW, may be considered simply an explicit label for missions and operations by armed
    forces that are carried out when there is no state of war. The former concept, “non-military war
    operations,” extends our understanding of exactly what constitutes a state of war to each and
    every field of human endeavor, far beyond what can be embraced by the term “military
    operations.” This type of extension is the natural result of the fact that human beings will use
    every conceivable means to achieve their goals. While it seems that the Americans are in the lead
    in every field of military theory, they were not able to take the lead in proposing this new
    concept of war. However, we cannot fail to recognize that the flood of U.S.-style pragmatism
    around the world, and the unlimited possibilities offered by new, high technology, were
    nevertheless powerful forces behind the emergence of this concept.
    So, which [of many kinds of unconventional] means, which seem totally unrelated to war, will
    ultimately become the favored minions of this new type of war–“the non-military war
    operation”–which is being waged with greater and greater frequency all around the world?

    Trade War: If one should note that, about a dozen years ago, “trade war” was still simply a
    descriptive phrase, today it has really become a tool in the hands of many countries for waging
    non-military warfare. It can be used with particularly great skill in the hands of the Americans,
    who have perfected it to a fine art. Some of the means used include: the use of domestic trade
    law on the international stage; the arbitrary erection and dismantling of tariff barriers; the use of
    hastily written trade sanctions; the imposition of embargoes on exports of critical technologies;
    the use of the Special Section 301 law; and the application of most-favored-nation (MFN)
    treatment, etc., etc. Any one of these means can have a destructive effect that is equal to that of a
    military operation. The comprehensive eight-year embargo against Iraq that was initiated by the
    U.S. is the most classic textbook example in this regard.
    Financial War: Now that Asians have experienced the financial crisis in Southeast Asia, no one
    could be more affected by “financial war” than they have been. No, they have not just been
    affected; they have simply been cut to the very quick! A surprise financial war attack that was
    deliberately planned and initiated by the owners of international mobile capital ultimately served
    to pin one nation after another to the ground–nations that not long ago were hailed as “little
    tigers” and “little dragons.” Economic prosperity that once excited the constant admiration of the
    Western world changed to a depression, like the leaves of a tree that are blown away in a single
    night by the autumn wind. After just one round of fighting, the economies of a number of
    countries had fallen back ten years. What is more, such a defeat on the economic front
    precipitates a near collapse of the social and political order. The casualties resulting from the
    constant chaos are no less than those resulting from a regional war, and the injury done to the
    living social organism even exceeds the injury inflicted by a regional war. Non-state
    organizations, in this their first war without the use of military force, are using non-military
    means to engage sovereign nations. Thus, financial war is a form of non-military warfare which
    is just as terribly destructive as a bloody war, but in which no blood is actually shed. Financial
    warfare has now officially come to war’s center stage–a stage that for thousands of years has been occupied only by soldiers and weapons, with blood and death everywhere. We believe that
    before long, “financial warfare” will undoubtedly be an entry in the various types of dictionaries
    of official military jargon. Moreover, when people revise the history books on twentieth-century
    warfare in the early 21st century, the section on financial warfare will command the reader’s
    utmost attention [see Endnote 12]. The main protagonist in this section of the history book will
    not be a statesman or a military strategist; rather, it will be George Soros. Of course, Soros does
    not have an exclusive monopoly on using the financial weapon for fighting wars. Before Soros,
    Helmut Kohl used the deutsche mark to breach the Berlin Wall–a wall that no one had ever been
    able to knock down using artillery shells [see Endnote 13]. After Soros began his activities, Li
    Denghui [Li Teng-hui 2621 4098 6540] used the financial crisis in Southeast Asia to devalue the
    New Taiwan dollar, so as to launch an attack on the Hong Kong dollar and Hong Kong stocks,
    especially the “red-chip stocks.” [Translator’s note: “red-chip stocks” refers to stocks of
    companies listed on the Hong Kong stock market but controlled by mainland interests.] In
    addition, we have yet to mention the crowd of large and small speculators who have come en
    masse to this huge dinner party for money gluttons, including Morgan Stanley and Moody’s,
    which are famous for the credit rating reports that they issue, and which point out promising
    targets of attack for the benefit of the big fish in the financial world [see Endnote 14]. These two
    companies are typical of those entities that participate indirectly in the great feast and reap the
    benefits.
    In the summer of 1998, after the fighting in the financial war had been going on for a full year,
    the war’s second round of battles began to unfold on an even more extensive battlefield, and this
    round of battles continues to this day. This time, it was not just the countries of Southeast Asia,
    (which had suffered such a crushing defeat during the previous year), that were drawn into the
    war. Two titans were also drawn in–Japan and Russia. This resulted in making the global
    economic situation even more grim and difficult to control. The blinding flames even set alight
    the fighting duds of those who ventured to play with fire in the first place. It is reported that Soros and his “Quantum Fund” lost not less than several billion dollars in Russia and Hong Kong
    alone [see Endnote 15]. Thus we can get at least an inkling of the magnitude of financial war’s
    destructive power. Today, when nuclear weapons have already become frightening mantlepiece
    decorations that are losing their real operational value with each passing day, financial war has
    become a “hyperstrategic” weapon that is attracting the attention of the world. This is because
    financial war is easily manipulated and allows for concealed actions, and is also highly
    destructive. By analyzing the chaos in Albania not long ago, we can clearly see the role played
    by various types of foundations that were set up by transnational groups and millionaires with
    riches rivaling the wealth of nation states. These foundations control the media, control subsidies
    to political organizations, and limit any resistance from the authorities, resulting in a collapse of
    national order and the downfall of the legally authorized government. Perhaps we could dub this
    type of war “foundation-style” financial war. The greater and greater frequency and intensity of
    this type of war, and the fact that more and more countries and non-state organizations are
    deliberately using it, are causes for concern and are facts that we must face squarely.
    New Terror War in Contrast to Traditional Terror War: Due to the limited scale of a traditional
    terror war, its casualties might well be fewer than the casualties resulting from a conventional
    war or campaign. Nevertheless, a traditional terror war carries a stronger flavor of violence.
    Moreover, in terms of its operations, a traditional terror war is never bound by any of the
    traditional rules of the society at large. From a military standpoint, then, the traditional terror war
    is characterized by the use of limited resources to fight an unlimited war. This characteristic
    invariably puts national forces in an extremely unfavorable position even before war breaks out,
    since national forces must always conduct themselves according to certain rules and therefore are
    only able to use their unlimited resources to fight a limited war. This explains how a terrorist
    organization made up of just a few inexperienced members who are still wet behind the ears can
    nevertheless give a mighty country like the U.S. headaches, and also why “using a sledgehammer
    to kill an ant” often proves ineffective. The most recent proof is the case of the two explosions that occurred simultaneously at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The advent of
    bin Ladin-style terrorism has deepened the impression that a national force, no matter how
    powerful, will find it difficult to gain the upper hand in a game that has no rules. Even if a
    country turns itself into a terrorist element, as the Americans are now in the process of doing, it
    will not necessarily be able to achieve success.
    Be that as it may, if all terrorists confined their operations simply to the traditional approach of
    bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and plane hijackings, this would represent less than the
    maximum degree of terror. What really strikes terror into people’s hearts is the rendezvous of
    terrorists with various types of new, high technologies that possibly will evolve into new
    superweapons. We already have a hint of what the future may hold–a hint that may well cause
    concern. When Aum Shinrikyo followers discharged “Sarin” poison gas in a Tokyo subway, the
    casualties resulting from the poison gas accounted for just a small portion of the terror. This
    affair put people on notice that modern biochemical technology had already forged a lethal
    weapon for those terrorists who would try to carry out the mass destruction of humanity [see
    Endnote 16]. In contradistinction to masked killers that rely on the indiscriminate slaughter of
    innocent people to produce terror, the “Falange Armed Forces” [Changqiangdang Wuzhuang
    7022 2847 7825 2976 5944] group in Italy is a completely different class of high-tech terrorist
    organization. Its goals are explicit and the means that it employs are extraordinary. It specializes
    in breaking into the computer networks of banks and news organizations, stealing stored data,
    deleting programs, and disseminating disinformation. These are classic terrorist operations
    directed against networks and the media. This type of terrorist operation uses the latest
    technology in the most current fields of study, and sets itself against humanity as a whole. We
    might well call this type of operation “new terror war.”
    Ecological War: Ecological war refers to a new type of non-military warfare in which modern
    technology is employed to influence the natural state of rivers, oceans, the crust of the earth, the
    polar ice sheets, the air circulating in the atmosphere, and the ozone layer. By methods such as causing earthquakes and altering precipitation patterns, the atmospheric temperature, the
    composition of the atmosphere, sea level height, and sunshine patterns, the earth’s physical
    environment is damaged or an alternate local ecology is created. Perhaps before very long, a
    man-made El Nino or La Nina effect will become yet another kind of superweapon in the hands
    of certain nations and/or non-state organizations. It is more likely that a non-state organization
    will become the prime initiator of ecological war, because of its terrorist nature, because it feels
    it has no responsibility to the people or to the society at large, and because non-state
    organizations have consistently demonstrated that they unwilling to play by the rules of the
    game. Moreover, since the global ecological environment will frequently be on the borderline of
    catastrophe as nations strive for the most rapid development possible, there is a real danger that
    the slightest increase or decrease in any variable would be enough to touch off an ecological
    holocaust.
    Aside from what we have discussed above, we can point out a number of other means and
    methods used to fight a non-military war, some of which already exist and some of which may
    exist in the future. Such means and methods include psychological warfare (spreading rumors to
    intimidate the enemy and break down his will); smuggling warfare (throwing markets into
    confusion and attacking economic order); media warfare (manipulating what people see and hear
    in order to lead public opinion along); drug warfare (obtaining sudden and huge illicit profits by
    spreading disaster in other countries); network warfare (venturing out in secret and concealing
    one’s identity in a type of warfare that is virtually impossible to guard against); technological
    warfare (creating monopolies by setting standards independently); fabrication warfare
    (presenting a counterfeit appearance of real strength before the eyes of the enemy); resources
    warfare (grabbing riches by plundering stores of resources); economic aid warfare (bestowing
    favor in the open and contriving to control matters in secret); cultural warfare (leading cultural
    trends along in order to assimilate those with different views); and international law warfare
    (seizing the earliest opportunity to set up regulations), etc., etc In addition, there are other types of non-military warfare which are too numerous to mention. In this age, when the plethora of
    new technologies can in turn give rise to a plethora of new means and methods of fighting war,
    (not to mention the cross-combining and creative use of these means and methods), it would
    simply be senseless and a waste of effort to list all of the means and methods one by one. What is
    significant is that all of these warfighting means, along with their corresponding applications,
    that have entered, are entering, or will enter, the ranks of warfighting means in the service of
    war, have already begun to quietly change the view of warfare held by all of mankind. Faced
    with a nearly infinitely diverse array of options to choose from, why do people want to enmesh
    themselves in a web of their own making and select and use means of warfare that are limited to
    the realm of the force of arms and military power? Methods that are not characterized by the use
    of the force of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even by the presence of casualties and
    bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate the successful realization of the war’s goals, if not more
    so. As a matter of course, this prospect has led to revision of the statement that “war is politics
    with bloodshed,” and in turn has also led to a change in the hitherto set view that warfare
    prosecuted through force of arms is the ultimate means of resolving conflict. Clearly, it is
    precisely the diversity of the means employed that has enlarged the concept of warfare.
    Moreover, the enlargement of the concept of warfare has, in turn, resulted in enlargement of the
    realm of war-related activities. If we confine ourselves to warfare in the narrow sense on the
    traditional battlefield now, it will very difficult for us to regain our foothold in the future. Any
    war that breaks out tomorrow or further down the road will be characterized by warfare in the
    broad sense–a cocktail mixture of warfare prosecuted through the force of arms and warfare that
    is prosecuted by means other than the force of arms.
    The goal of this kind of warfare will encompass more than merely “using means that involve the
    force of arms to force the enemy to accept one’s own will.” Rather, the goal should be “to use all
    means whatsoever–means that involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the force
    of arms, means that involve military power and means that do not involve military power, means that entail casualties and means that do not entail casualties–to force the enemy to serve one’s
    own interests.”

    ENDNOTES

    1. For more on the close relationship between Iraq and the U.S., the reader may refer to Desert
    Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander, Junshi Yiwen [6511
    0057 6146 2429] Publishing House, p. 212. “Iraq had established extremely close relations with
    the United States. Iraq had received weapons and valuable intelligence regarding Iranian
    movements from the U.S., as well as U.S. military support for attacks on Iran’s navy.”
    2. An article by the then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin entitled “On the Sea Change in the
    Security Environment” was published in the February, 1993, issue of The Officer magazine,
    (published in the U.S.):
    A Comparison of The New and the Old Security Environments
    1. In Regard to the Geopolitical Environment
    OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
    Bipolar (rigid) Multipolar (complex)
    Predictable Uncertain
    Communism Nationalism and religious extremism
    U.S. the number one Western power U.S. only the number one military power
    Permanent alliances Temporary alliances
    A paralyzed U.N. A dynamic U.N.
    2. In Regard to Threats Faced by the U.S.
    OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
    Single (Soviet) Diverse
    Threat to U.S. survival Threat to U.S. interests
    Clear Unclear

    Deterrable Non-deterrable
    Europe-centered Other regions
    High risk of escalation Little risk of escalation
    Use of strategic nuclear weapons Terrorists using nuclear weapons
    Overt Covert
    3. In Regard to the Use of Military Force
    OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
    Attrition warfare Decisive attacks on key targets
    War by proxy Direct reinforcement
    Reliance primarily on high technology Integrated use of high, medium and low
    technology
    Forward deployed Power projection
    Forward based Home based
    Host nation support Reliance on own strength
    From the table above, one can see the sensitivity of the Americans to the changes in their
    security environment, and also the various types of forces and factors that are constraining and
    influencing the formation of the world’s new setup since the conclusion of the Cold War.
    3. “Technological space” is a new concept that we are proposing in order to distinguish this type
    of space from physical space.
    4. According to the U.S. Department of Defense National Defense Report for fiscal year 1998,
    the number of U.S. military personnel has been cut by 32% since 1989. In addition, the U.S.
    retired a large amount of obsolete equipment, thus actually increasing combat strength to some
    degree even while large reductions in U.S. military personnel were being carried out. The U.S.
    DOD issued its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in May of 1997. The QDR emphasized
    “taking the future into consideration and reforming the U.S. military.” It advocated continued

    personnel cuts and building the U.S. military in accordance with new military affairs theories.
    However, it also advocated comparatively greater expenditures for the purchase of equipment.
    5. This story first appeared in the British Sunday Telegraph. According to this report, the U.S.
    military carried out a “Joint Warrior” exercise from Sep 18 until Sep 25, 1995, in order to test the
    security of its national defense electronics systems. During the exercise, an Air Force officer
    successfully hacked into the naval command system, (see The Network is King by Hu Yong
    [5170 3144] and Fan Haiyan [5400 3189 3601], Hainan Publishing House, pp. 258-259.) There
    are many similar stories, but there also are some military experts who believe that these are cases
    of “throwing up a confusing mist before someone’s eyes.”
    6. In their book War and Anti-War, Alvin and Heidi Toffler wrote: “If the tools of warfare are no
    longer tanks and artillery, but rather computer viruses and microrobots, then we can no longer
    say that nations are the only armed groups or that soldiers are the only ones in possession of the
    tools of war.” In his article entitled “What the Revolution in Military Affairs is Bringing–The
    Form War Will Take in 2020,” a Colonel in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces by the name of
    Shoichi Takama has noted that the civilianization of war will be an important characteristic of
    21st century warfare.
    7. Many hackers are adopting a new tactic which might be styled “network guerrilla warfare.”
    8. Precision warfare is a new form of warfighting. It came about as a result of combining
    increased weapons accuracy with increased battlefield transparency. (See “From Gettysburg to
    the Gulf and Beyond,” by Colonel Richard J. Dunn III [McNair Paper 13, 1992], quoted in
    World Military Affairs Yearbook for 1997, [1997 Nian Shijie Junshi Nianjian], published by the
    PLA in Chinese, pp. 294-295.)
    9. “Joint Vision 2010,” a document prepared by the [Chairman of the] U.S. Joint Chiefs of
    Staff/Joint Staff. See Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1996.
    10. See the U.S. Army’s 1993 edition of Operations Essentials, [translator’s note: this probably
    refers to FM 100-5, “Operations,” Department of the Army, June, 1993]. Consult ARMY
    Magazine (U.S.), June, 1993.
    11. After his research on the Gulf War, the Russian tactical expert I.N. Vorobyev pointed out that
    remote combat is a warfighting method that has great potential. (Military Thought, in Russian,
    1992, #11.)
    12. There was an article entitled “Financial Markets are the Biggest Threat to Peace” in the
    August 23, 1998, issue of the Los Angeles Times. The article noted: “At present, financial
    markets constitute the biggest threat to world peace, not terrorist training camps.” (See Reference
    News [Cankao Xiaoxi 0639 5072 3194 1873], Beijing, September 7, 1998.)
    13. Who Has Joined the Fray?–Helmut Kohl, by Wang Jiannan [3769 0494 0589], China
    Broadcasting Publishing House [in Chinese], 1997, pp. 275, 232, 357.
    14. An article entitled “A New York Corporation that Affects Economies” in the July 29, 1998,
    issue of The Christian Science Monitor disclosed how Moody’s credit rating reports influence
    and even manipulate economic trends in Italy, South Korea, Japan and Malaysia. See Reference
    News, August 20, 1998.
    15. Soros pours out all his bitterness in his book, The Crisis of Global Capitalism. On the basis
    of a ghastly account of his investments in 1998, Soros analyzes the lessons to be learned from
    this economic crisis.
    16. Some security experts in the U.S. have suggested to the government that it lay up large stores
    of antidotes, in order to guard against a surprise chemical attack by a terrorist organization.

    Chapter 3 to be Continue…..

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